Wireless power charging enables portable devices to be permanently unplugged. Due to its low transmission power and low transmission efficiency, it requires much longer time slot to charge users compared with that for data transmission in wireless communication networks. Besides, each user's demand urgency needs to be taken into consideration for power allocation. Therefore, new algorithms are essential for wireless power allocation in multi-user wireless charging networks. In this paper, this problem is formulated as a static noncooperative game. It is shown that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the static state of the wireless power charging network. A distributed power allocation algorithm is proposed to compute the Nash equilibrium of the game. The main result of the paper consists of rigorous analysis of the distributed algorithm for power allocation. The algorithm is shown to converge to Nash equilibrium of the game with exponentially convergence rate for arbitrary initial value with synchronous scheduling. Moreover, the distributed algorithm is also convergence guaranteed with asynchronous scheduling under communication delay and packet drops. Numerical simulations prove the correctness of the analysis and demonstrate the fast convergence of the algorithm and the robustness to synchronous scheduling.
and is still missing. Different from the multi-user communication, multi-user wireless power charging has its unique feature and raise new challenges. First, wireless power charging, due to low transmission power and low transmission efficiency, takes much longer time to full charge users compared with data transmission in wireless communication networks. Besides, the battery capacities for each user may vary and lead to different levels of aspiration for power charging. Therefore, with limited power at the transmitter, multi-user charging power allocation is an important issue to be solved with consideration of different users expected amount and duration.
In this paper, we model the competition of limited charging power among users via game theory. In general, the priority of power allocation should give to a user with low state of charge and tight charging deadline. In order to be able to ensure at which state the multi-user wireless charing networks will effectively operate, we provide rigourous analysis of the Nash equilibrium.
The contributions can be summarized as follows • We propose a game framework for wireless power allocation to multiple users with different charging needs and deadlines. Users compete for the limited power by independently submitting a unit price bid to the power transmitter, and proportional sharing of power follows for the power allocation.
• We analyze this wireless power allocation problem using rigorous game-theoretic analysis.
We show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for wireless power allocation.
Besides, we show for arbitrary initial values the convergence to the Nash equilibrium with exponential rate.
• In many practical scenarios, the inter-user information exchange is asynchronous since random data packet losses may occur, and different nodes may update at different frequencies.
These impacts are considered in computing the Nash equilibrium, which represent a general framework including the synchronous updating as a special case.
• The power allocation algorithm takes the advantage of distributed computation [10] - [12] .
The users' charging capacity and charging deadline is not required to be shared while computing the Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the problem modeling and formulation. Section III rigourously shows the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, proposes a distributed algorithm to reach the Nash equilibrium with exponentially convergence rate, which is also robust to communication delay and packet loss. Section IV shows the January 23, 2018 DRAFT simulation results of distributed multi-user wireless charging power allocation. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a wireless charging server with total transition power P , which serves the charging services of M users in the its effective charging area. V = {1, . . . , M } denotes the set of users.
Similar to the single-input-multiple-output communication systems, the transmitter's power is wirelessly transferred to multiple users. Let h i be the wireless power charging efficiency to user i, with value varying from 0 to 1, which is defined as the received power at the receiver divided by the input power for charing i at the charging server. Note that with different types of wireless power transmission schemes, h i has different physical meaning. More specifically, in the MRC based wireless power charging system, h i depends on the mutual inductance between electromagnetic coils of the transmitter and i th receiver [8] . While in the RF based wireless power transmission schemes, h i is the product of the transmit efficiency, the free-space propagation efficiency and the receive efficiency [4] . In the state-of-the-art, in order to improve the endto-end power charging efficiency, researchers efforts were focused on enhancing the wireless power transmission efficiency via designing the non-radiated magnetic field or RF signal array to reduce the side lobes of the beam pattern while keep its main lobe keeps spillover losses to a minimum [9] . In the RF based wireless power transmission schemed, attaining higher receive efficiency was also attempted through the design of high-performance rectifying antennas [13] (i.e. rectennas), which convert the incident RF power back to DC.
In contrast to the high data transmission rate achieved in wireless communication networks, to transmit certain amount of power for wireless charging takes much longer time due to the limited of wireless transmission power and low wireless charging effiency. Therefore, each user i has an expected charging period [0, D i ], after D i user i has to leave the effective charging area, and C i is the amount of energy that is needed to fulfill i's power consumption, such as communication, requirement at current time. Each time, user i submits a unit price bid x i to compete for the amount of power transmitted from the charging server, and proportional sharing mechanism [14] applies, i.e., P is allocated to each user in proportion to their unit price bids.
Hence, the received power at user i is
Note that a reasonable unit price bid should be non-negative i.e.,
The user's satisfaction to the wireless charging service relies on whether the charged device can fulfil its requirement. Hence, the satisfaction metric of each user can be defined as
Note that C i /D i means the received amount of power that is able to full charge user i, which is the expected minimum charging rate for user i. Thus, s i is the ratio of the allocated power charging rate y i with the minimum expected charging rate. The physical meaning is that if s i = 1, In order to obtain energy from the charging server, user i needs to pay for the service.
Therefore, the utility function that user i tries to maximize can be formulated as (1) and (3) into (4), the utility function is
The multi-user wireless charging problems can then be formalized as a non-cooperative game with the following triplet structure:
where V denotes the game players; S i being the range of x i represents the game strategy, which is a subset of positive real numbers; and {U i (x i , x V\i )} i∈V is the utility function for player i. The concept of a best response is central for problem formulation and analysis with game theory.
The formal definition is given as follows.
Definition 1
The best response function F i (x V\i ) of user i is the best strategy for user i given the power allocation of the others, which is then the solution to the following maximization problem:
Note that for each i, the maximum is taken over
We show in Appendix A that the best response function for user i in analytically form is
where
. The best response function (8) reflects the fact that all users take independently their best available actions in order to pursue their own individual objectives as expressed by the particular choice of x i . Since j∈V\i x j > 0, the best response function (8) can be reformulated as
and it is evident that when some user j = i increases, F i (x V\i ) will decrease. This observation indicates that what is best for one link depends in general upon actions of other links due to the total energy constraint at the charging server. Thus, an equilibrium for the whole system is reached when every user is unilaterally optimum, i.e., when, given the current strategies of the others, any change in his own strategy would result in a in terms of F i (x V\i ). This equilibrium constitutes the celebrated notion of Nash equilibrium. We define the joint best response function
and S 1 , . . . , S M , respectively. Then the corresponding Nash equilibrium for the multiuser wireless charging power allocation game is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2 A pure strategy profile
In general, the game G in (6) may admit multiple equilibria. In the next section, we will prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and we analyze the property of how to converge to such an equilibrium in a fully distributed way [].
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM ANALYSIS

A. Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In this subsection, we will show that there is always a unique Nash equilibrium for the game G in (6) is always exists. Note that the standard interference functions introduced by
Yates [15] have been very influential on the Nash equilibrium analysis and design of distributed power control laws for wireless communication networks. Quite a number of works [16] - [18] has been motivated by [15] which conduct the Nash equilibrium analysis via showing that the corresponding best response function is a standard function. While the standard function framework is powerful, the framework does not shown the existence of fixed-points and there is no guarantees on the rate of convergence of the iterates. Note that, recently, [19] - [21] shows that the distributed belief propagation algorithm equals maximizing local utility function to find a Nash equilibrium and the convergence rate is analyzed. Further, the convergence rate of a variant of standard belief propagation is also analyzed in [22] . However, these conclusions cannot be used in our problem due to the fact that the type of utility functions are different. Motivated by [15] and [19] - [22] , we show some unique properties of the best response function in (8) first and then conduct the Nash equilibria and distributed computation algorithm analysis.
Property 1
The updating operator F(·) satisfies the following properties:
Proof 1
The proof is shown in Appendix B.
Note that Nash equilibrium does not always exist. If the set S i for all i ∈ V was a closed, bounded, and convex subset of the one dimensional Euclidean space, and U i (x V\i ) is a strictly concave function in S, then the noncooperative game (6) has a Nash equilibrium [23, p. 173 ].
This theorem is often used to check the existenceness of Nash equilibirum in literature [24] - [26] .
However, S i is not a compact set as shown in (2), and traditional analysis method fails. Next the existence of Nash equilibria is studied.
Theorem 1
The non-cooperative wireless charging game in (6) admits at least one Nash equi-
Proof 2 Since F(·) is a continous function and considering P 1.1, F(x n ) must be upper bounded
By defining u =
By repeatly applying F(·) on both sides of the inequality we have x (n) < x (n−1) . Therefore x {n} is a monotonically decreasing sequence lower bounded by 0. According to monotonic theorem, it must converge. Thus there exsit a fixed point x * which satifies x * = F(x * ). Thus the non-cooperative power game in (6) admits at least one Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
It is possible that a game has multiple Nash equilibirums. Next, we show the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in (6).
Theorem 2 The Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative wireless charging game in (6) is unique.
Proof 3
The uniqueness property of the converged x (n) , denoted as x * is proved by contradiction. Suppose there are two distinct fixed points x * andx * . Without loss of generality, there exist
Applying F(·) on (11), and considering P 1.1, we have
where the equality follows the definition of fixed point of x * . Besides, as x * j > 0 and 0 < α < 1, following P 1.2, we have F(αx * ) > αx * . According to (12), we obtaiñ
Now we can conclude that (11) and (13) is a contradiction, and therefore x * andx * are the same fixed point. Therefore, x (n) converges to a unique fixed positive value.
B. Distributed Algorithm and Convergence Analysis
In the previous subsection, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium have been established by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. In order to compute the unique Nash equilibrium, the charging server could gather all the users' information together to perform the computation. However, the parameter K i , which depends on user i's charging deadline and capacity, is the privacy information of user i, and individual user may not be willing to transmit these information to the charging server. In order to reach the Nash equilibrium of the game without sharing individual privacy information, distributed iterative computation procedure is preferred. In this section, we first give the synchronous updating algorithm and then analytically prove that for arbitrary initial value of the distributed computation algorithm, the distance between initial value and the Nash equilibrium decreases exponentially. We will also study how to choose the initial value to make the distributed algorithm converges faster.
We introduce some preliminary definitions to provide a formal description of the distributed computation algorithm. We assume, without any loss of generality, that the set of times at which one or more users update their strategies is the discrete set T = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Let x (n) i with n ∈ T denote the unit price bid of user i at the n th iteration. Hence, according to (8) , the unit price bid of user i is given by
It is noteworthy that user i only needs to compute x i . Each node i computes its updated message according to (14) at independent time n ∈ T with its available x (n−1)
V\i . Then the joint distributed computation function is
Mathematically speaking, analyzing the Nash equilibrium of (6) equals to analyze the corresponding fixed point problem of (15) [27] . It is shown in [19] , [20] that if an iterative function has some specific properties, the convergence is guaranteed and the convergence rate can be identified. We next show the convergence property of F(·) follow the proof procedure in [19] , [20] .
Theorem 3 x (n) converges to the unique Nash equilibrium x * of the non-cooperative wireless charging game in (6) for any initial bids x (0) ∈ S.
Proof 4 As shown in Theorem 2, the Nash equilibrium is unique. Then the posiibility of inital bid x (0) can be categorized into three groups: 1) the bid for each user is larger than its Nash euilibrium, i.e., x * < x (0) . 2) the bid for each user is smaller than its Nash euilibrium, i.e.,
3) some of the bid for each user is larger than its Nash euilibrium, and some of the bid for each user is smaller than its Nash euilibrium.
1) x * < x (0) : There exist α ≥ 1 which satisfies x (0) ≤ αx * . Following the monotinic property, we
Then,x (1) <x (0) implies thatx (t) is a monotinocally decreasing sequence. Thusx (t) converges.
Since x * is the unique fixed point,x (t) also converges to x * . As
3) indefinite: There exist x u and x l such that 0 < x l < x (0) < x u and 0 < x l < x * < x u .
Follwing case 1) lim →∞ F ( ) (x u ) = x * ; and Follwing case 2) lim →∞ F ( ) (x u ) = x * ; Thus,
Another fundamental question is how fast the convergence would be. Define a set
with > 0 being an arbitrary small value. Next, we give the definition of the part metric first, and then show that the distance between {x (n) } n=1,... and the unique Nash equilibrium x * decreases doubly exponentially fast with respect to part metric in C.
For a proof of the fact that d(x, y) is a metric and for other properties of the part metric we refer to [28] . Then following the proof in [19] , we can show the convergence rate is doubly exponential.
Theorem 4
With the initial bid x (0) set to be arbitrary value in S, the distance between x (n) and x * decreases doubly exponentially fast with n increases.
The physical intuition of Theorem 4 is that the sequence {x (n) } l=1,... converges at a geometric rate before x (n) enters x * 's neighborhood, which can be chose arbitrarily small. Next we show how to make sure the monotonic convergence.
Theorem 5 x (n) converges monotonically for any initial value
Proof 5 On one hand, if x ≥ F(x) holds for some x, we can establish that
. By induction, this relationship can be extended to
n) must be a monotonic sequence. Since x (n) > 0, for all n ≥ 0 and considering P 1.1, we have F(x) must within the range of F (0) and F(+∞1). As shown in (10), we have F(+∞1) = u. On the other hand, substituting
, we obtain F(0) = 0. Hence, the bounded monotonic x (n) converges.
Note that to guarantee {x ≥ F(x) ∪ F(x) ≥ x} = ∅ we need to choose
Thereby, Theorem 1 is equivalent to
Hence, to guarantee the convergence in a monotonic fashion, we can simply set
Next, we will show how to choose the initial value x (0) to make x (n) converges faster in a monotonic fashion.
Theorem 6 x (n) is convergence guaranteed with arbitrary initial value x (0) within the set [u, x U ), and with different x (0) in this range, x (n) converges to the same value. With x (0) = u, the iteration (14) converges faster than the same iteration with any other x (0) ∈ (u, +∞).
Proof 6
We denote by x (n) the vector sequence of (14) with initial value x (0) = u and by y (n) the vector sequence with y (0) ∈ (u, +∞). We shall prove that
and ||x
for n = 0, 1, . . . ,. We prove the above results by induction. At the start, we have
Assume that x (n) < y (n) . According to P 1.1, we obtain (17) is proved and with x (0) = u, then the iteration (14) converges faster than the same iteration with any other x (0) ∈ [u, +∞).
We have analyzed the convergence property of synchronous updating x at each iteration only occurs after every user receiving updated
from all its neighbors. However, in practice networks, due to communication packet drops or processing delay the convergence speed of the distributed algorithm would be slow. Next, a totally asynchronous bid updating is analyzed.
C. Asynchronous Power Allocation
With the totally asynchronous updating scheme, all the users compute their individual best response function (8) j computed by other node j with s ≤ n − 1. In order to capture these asynchronous properties of message exchanges, totally asynchronous updating has been adopted in wireless communication networks [?] , [29] , [30] . Next we introduce the totally asynchronous scheduling definition and formulate the totally asynchronous distributed best response updating. According to Definition 3, the asynchronous updating version of (14) can be expressed as
Note that x (n) i is the outgoing information from user i, the corresponding avaiable bid used for computation at user j is denoted by x τ j (n−1) i
. and x
The synchronous version of (14) is a special case of asynchronous updating in (14) without considering the possible information loss due to communications and different user may have different updating frequencies. Suppose user i only update and the time instance T i , then the outgoing information is
Following the same arguments in the proof of Theorem 1, we have the following convergence properties for the asynchronous updating.
Corollary 1 With the asynchronous updating as in (19) , x (n) is convergence guaranteed for any initial value x (0) ∈ S.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section provides simulation results on the tests of the developed synchronous and asynchronous distributed multi-user wireless charging power allocation algorithms proposed in Section III. The related wireless charging parameters are generated according to a wireless charging prototype in [9] which charges users iPhone 4s based on MRC method. More specifically, for different users, the received power However, the proposed distributed multi-user charging power allocation algorithm and Nash equilibrium analysis is adapt to different charging methods and users. For the asynchronous updating, the probability of user i successfully pass x (n) i to user j is p i,j , with p i,j ≤ 1. Therefore, p i,j emulate the asynchronous network due to packet loss or communicating delay. The weighting parameter λ is set to be 1 without specification. In Figure 4 , we show the Nash equilibrium with respect to the number of users M . For each case all the parameters are set to be the same for a fair comparison. For each user, C i /D i is set to be 1.2. It is demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium for each user x * i monotonically increases as M increases. This is due to the completion among the users gradually become more severe such that the bid offered by each user at the equilibrium also increases.
Next we demonstrate the social welfare behavior of wireless charging user. The social welfare of the users is defined as
For each fixed user number, C i /D i are uniformly generated from R and h i is uniformly generated from D. Each point in the figure is an average of 1000 times simulation. First, Figure 5 shows that the social welfare of the users monotonically decreases for the reason of the increasing competition among the users, which implies the increasing social welfare of the charging server.
Second, if as the portion of urgency in the utility function decreases the utility function is increases. The efficiency of a noncooperative game is defined as the ratio of the highest value of the social welfare to the worse Nash equilibrium of the game. By assuming users are cooperative, the highest value of the social welfare is computed by
Besides, since we have shown in Theorem 2 that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in G, the price of anarchy of the game G is Figure 6 shows that the price of anarchy increases slowly with the number of users which implies the social welfare gap between cooperative optimal and noncooperative optimal increases slowly.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a fully distributed multi-user wireless charging power allocation scheme has been proposed. It has taken into consideration of the impact of charging time on the power allocating problem. The proposed distributed algorithm only involves limited information exchanges among users and avoids sharing privacy information as in the centralized algorithm. We have presented a rigorous analysis for the existence and unique of the Nash equilibrium for both synchronous and asynchronous updating. Moreover, we have proved that the distributed algorithm converges with a exponential rate. Simulations have verified the theatrical analysis and shown the efficiency of the power allocation algorithm. APPENDIX A By taking the second derivative of U i (x i , x V\i ) in (20) with respect to x i , we obtain
As x j > 0 for all j ∈ V, it is clear that ∂ 2 U i (x i , x V\i )/∂x 2 i < 0. Therefore, the utility function U i (x i , x V\i ) is strictly concave, and the best response function, according to Definition 1, can be obtained by setting the first derivative of U i (x i , x V\i ) to be zero, i.e.,
After some algebraic manipulations, the best response function for user i can be readily given by
APPENDIX B
By taking the first-order derivative of F i (x V\i ) in (8) with respect to x i , we obtain
After performing some algebraic manipulations, the numerator of (25) can be reformulated as
Therefore,
and hence, it is clear that
> 0. Thus, F i (·) or equivalently, F(·) satisfies that x ≥ y implies F(x) ≥ F(y).
Next, we will show P 1.2. For arbitrary x ∈ S and α < 1, it can be shown that
Thus, by the definition of F i (·), (28) implies F i (αx V\i ) > αF i (x V\i ) = αx V\i . Thus we have F(αx) > αF(x). With similar argument, we can also show that α −1 F(x) > F(α −1 x).
